In the words of historian John Lewis Gaddis, grand strategy requires both a compass and a map. Metaphorically speaking, a compass provides strategic direction toward a desired end state, and a map is the situational awareness needed to avoid major obstacles in your path.
As Israel faces an increasingly conflictual regional environment, it is certainly worrying that the government overseen by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appears to lack clear strategic direction in any of the relevant areas. be.
In any case, Israel’s national security strategy, developed by October 7, 2023, will need to be rebalanced to take into account the threats that have emerged since Hamas’ massacre of Israeli civilians.
What this means in practice is that Israel needs to reevaluate how it prioritizes and allocates its limited military and intelligence resources. Until now this seemed to be primarily focused on the Northern Front (Hezbollah and Iranian-backed operations in Syria) and Iran, but decision-makers have shown a greater than expected ability and willingness to attack Israel. New threat actors (including Hamas) need to be considered. The Houthis in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen, and Iranian-backed militias in Iraq. This requires consideration of both the urgency and importance of such threats.
The good news is that Israel has many of the tools it needs to act against these malign regional forces backed by the Islamic Republic. The country’s air force is world-class, its ground forces have gained valuable experience against Hamas and Hezbollah over the past six months, and its defense technology ecosystem is exceptional. Hezbollah members raise flags during the annual Hezbollah Martyrs’ Day commemoration rally in Beirut’s southern suburbs last month. (Credit: AZIZ TAHER/REUTERS)
Israel also has a top-notch intelligence service that can contact the most feared malign actors in places like Lebanon and Syria. No less important than her first two strategic assets is the special relationship between the United States and Israel. These relationships provide Jerusalem with a network of operational partners, diplomatic support in hostile international forums like the Security Council, and essential support to fight long wars that can quickly become exhausting. Stockpiling ammunition.
To be clear, the relationship between the United States and Israel is complex, and there are inevitable frictions between the interests of two separate countries with naturally different advantages and interests. The inevitable policy challenges are further exacerbated by the complexities of the interpersonal relationship between Prime Minister Netanyahu and US President Joe Biden, and the prospects for elections in both countries, especially, make it difficult for Israel to pursue a war with Hamas. The two leaders are increasingly taking domestic public opinion into consideration when deciding whether to do so. . However, the alliance between the two countries has held up well since October 7, despite the fact that it has not been formally formalized as a defense treaty.
But one has to wonder how effective a superior air force, superior intelligence, and cooperative allies can be if Jerusalem does not offer a clear vision of what to achieve. Prime Minister Netanyahu’s strategic objective against Hamas has been reduced to an unconvincing catchphrase of “total victory.”
Tragically, Israel’s tactical and military successes in Gaza appear not to be leveraged to achieve long-term goals that might relieve the deadly terrorist organization Hamas from its role in controlling Gaza. It’s coming. In yet another arena, Israel appears headed for the same type of perpetual “whack-a-mole” it plays in countries like Syria.
question the approach
There are good reasons to question whether such an approach is sustainable, and even if it is, whether it is optimal. Targeting terrorist leaders may temporarily unbalance the organization, and while it is certainly a well-deserved objective for terrorist individuals, it is no substitute for a coherent long-term strategy.
Since October 7, Biden has warned Israel not to make the same mistakes the United States made after 9/11. Stalling in costly counterinsurgency operations, whether in Afghanistan or Gaza, costs a great deal of blood and treasure, but equally important is the opportunity cost of such operations, diverting the country from countering its most dangerous rivals. It may distract your attention. In the case of the United States and the Global War on Terror, it is the rise and emboldening of China and Russia, and in the case of Israel, it risks being distracted from the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is the core of Israel’s regional agenda.
Refocusing away from Iran’s conventional and nuclear threats will naturally impact Iran’s strategy to train, indoctrinate, and arm its proxies. At the same time, increasingly dangerous agents armed with sophisticated weapons cannot be ignored. Israel should do the minimum against Iranian proxies and the maximum to directly target Iran with the support of its partners and allies.
But beyond that, Jerusalem must explain what goals and end state it seeks to achieve in these areas. It would be unrealistic to maintain the momentum of “cutting the grass” in more than five countries in the Middle East. The October 7 massacre by Hamas should have been a wake-up call on this issue. Even in territories bordering Israel, the practice lost momentum after more than a decade, and then Gaza erupted.
Israel may have the means to move toward strategic goals against the Iranian threat network, but without a compass to guide its strategic direction, its policy is more reactive than strategic. It will remain tactical.
The lack of clear guidance from the political class charged with overseeing the defense posture also puts the country at risk of becoming entangled with less strategically important adversaries and diverting attention from its most dangerous adversaries. has been done.
Following the collapse of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s understanding of Israel’s strategic environment on October 7, he should approach all previous assumptions with new skepticism.
Until the Israeli government is able to delineate clearer strategic objectives to anchor its policy toward the Iranian threat network, Israel’s national security policy will remain in limbo.
The author advises Israeli defense technology startups entering the US federal market and consults with various organizations on the Houthi threat in Yemen.
