Written by Mauricio D. Aceves
Since the Islamic Revolution, the conflict between Israel and Iran has been driven by covert and non-direct operations, and has gone through periods of high tension and deceleration, including covert operations and retaliatory attacks on the high seas and retaliation to sabotage Iran’s nuclear program, military facilities, and energy infrastructure. In cyberspace (1), it has become a favored means of expressing mutual hostility. This timeline also includes the April 1 Israeli airstrike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus, Syria, which killed Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officers, including General Mohammad Reza Zahedi of the Quds Force. (2)
Iran’s response was an attack from home, with 170 drones simultaneously firing 120 surface-to-surface ballistic missiles and 30 cruise missiles. (3) A similar counterattack from Israel targeted Iranian air defense facilities near Isfahan. (4) According to press statements and media reports, most projectiles were intercepted in both operations and the damage was not significant. Only a few missiles hit their targets.
These few days mark the end of one phase and the beginning of a new one. Direct fire exchanges combined with hybrid operations set a precedent that could recalibrate power relations in the region. Several messages were delivered from both sides. Tehran drew a red line with a direct hit on Israel, demonstrating to its neighbors the power of its firepower. Israel’s symmetrical response demonstrates its technological capabilities to counter direct military intervention and its ability to maintain fronts on multiple fronts across a wide geographic area and range of attacks on Iranian territory.
So far, the deterrence forces that regional powers have developed over the past few decades appear to be failing. Iran is building networks, particularly in Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria, with numerous non-state actors to strengthen deterrence and build military pressure for geopolitical advancement and attrition of its rivals. Alliance has become the chosen option. Other countries have replicated this model, offering the power of deniability to avoid escalation or direct retaliation.
On the other side of the table, even though the US withdrawal from the region is not complete, its influence has declined and security agreements with Israel have weakened. Meanwhile, the democratic situation in Israel has also led to changes in operational and diplomatic communications.
The First Gulf War was probably the last symmetrical war in the region, fought by professional conventional forces using all means available. The war ended in an exhausting eight-year war, with no borders gained, and served as a prelude to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The current situation has triggered a warning in the area. But that doesn’t mean the Middle East is on the brink of collapse. Rather, a new dimension of conflict is unfolding.
Over the past few decades, the shadows and gray areas of war have been recognized as competitive battlegrounds. In contrast, direct involvement is now an accepted option, although policymakers recognize the risk of significant escalation. This scenario represents new challenges for regional stability. Iran has shown no interest in continuing the spiral of retaliation, and the United States is urging Israel to contain its response.
Western leaders have called for restraint to prevent a wider regional war, and major power-mediated negotiations are underway in defiance of Security Council gridlock (5). It is unclear whether these efforts will deter belligerent action or lessen the devastation. and the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Even if different interests conflict, the common concerns and inconveniences are sufficient to sustain diplomacy. From a regional perspective, expansion has serious negative regional impacts and benefits are small or non-existent.
In contrast, what does victory look like?
The decisions and long-term diplomatic mediation experience of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkiye, Qatar, Jordan, Oman and the United Arab Emirates will be crucial for future developments. Saudi Arabia’s negotiations with the United States and Israel on compliance with the Abraham Accords, the resumption of relations with Iran through a trilateral joint statement, and talks within the framework of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation are diplomatic movements aimed at: . It is about maintaining a balance, rather than weathering large-scale conflicts only to exhaust what has been gained in terms of regional stability, national development, and international prestige. We cannot afford to lose ongoing negotiations. Negotiation in diplomacy is like a night’s rest. It’s better to have something than nothing.
The 1943 Tehran Conference was a milestone in developing a strategy to end World War II. The Middle East must be a place to re-agree a treaty to create new forms of long-term guarantees. The current framework bears no resemblance to what you’ll find in the history books. The regional environment is unstable, and part of its roots lie in instability within states. However, a new regional understanding needs to be reached. On the brink of war, “de-escalation” can be the path to negotiation and finding an emergency exit, but only solid governments can commit to this in the midst of turmoil.
For now, while avoiding a cycle of diplomatic isolation (mild at best in the current multilateral atmosphere), the Israeli government has been able to operate effectively across its borders and utilize advanced technology to advance in some military areas. We have demonstrated the ability to gain an advantage. This is because the national security strategy and ultimate goals have not yet been determined. Intentions, abilities, and emotions remain hidden in a gray area. Uncovering them is part of the reality of conflict and part of the potential for solutions.
About the author: Mauricio D. Aceves is a security and border affairs advisor at STRATOP Risk Consulting and author of Latin American Foreign Affairs on Contemporary Middle East and Central Asia Issues. Source: This article was written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations.
References
(1) International Crisis Group, “Iran-Israel “Shadow War” Risk of Spending Out of Control,” ICG, April 12, 2024. https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and -Arabian Peninsula/Iran-Israel-Palestine/Iran-Israel-Shadow War
(2) Shaikh, Shaan, “Iran-Israel Aviation Conflict, One Week in Time,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 19, 2024.Conflict – 1 week
(3) Same as above.
(4) Atlantic Council, “Experts react: Israel just launched a limited attack on Iran. Is this the end of tit-for-tat?” Atlantic Council, April 19, 2024. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react/experts-react-israel-just-conducted-attacks limited to Iran/
(5) Gordon, Michael R., Said, Sommer, and Gordon, Rubold, “White House Pushes New Historic Deal to Forge Saudi-Israel Ties,” Wall Street Journal, April 18, 2024. wsj.com/world/middle-east/white-house-makes-fresh-push-for-history-deal-to-forge-saudi-israel-ties-68ed3a8c#
(6) United Nations News, “US rejects Palestine’s request for full UN membership,” United Nations, April 18, 2024. https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/04/1148731
