The failure of Israeli diplomacy in the Israel-Hamas war
According to Levy, when the war began, Israel had no full-time foreign media spokesperson, and the existing system relied heavily on volunteers rather than professional, full-time spokespersons fluent in multiple languages. Israeli public relations was rather driven by the military, specifically the IDF Press Corps under the command of Major General Daniel Hagari, giving the country an atmosphere of “martial law”. Journalists seeking government comment were often referred to a single person, who was understaffed and supported by volunteers who sacrificed their lives to support the war effort. The Public Information Office, established to address inefficient communications after the Second Lebanon War, focused on domestic communications within Israel, especially in the early days of the conflict.
While the civilian side was largely improvised, populated by volunteers and understaffed, the IDF had improved its ability to respond to external public relations communications. “The IDF Public Relations Department has done a lot of things right and has improved its ability to communicate with international media many times,” Conricus said. “In all of these situations, whether it was Al Ahli Hospital, UNRWA, Al Shifa Hospital, international media was given priority and Admiral Hagari spoke in English and really brought the international media to the forefront. There were multiple cases where international media had access to breaking news that the Israeli media did not have access to.” Advertisement for a Misgav Institute webinar. (Credit: Courtesy of Misgav)
Conricus noted that while there are good examples of crisis communication, there is a lack of strategy: “What I think is missing at a larger strategic level is for the State of Israel to recognize that international media PR, international public relations, and public policy are strategic drivers. If we don’t get this right, we’re shooting ourselves in the foot and limiting our ability to execute and pursue our strategic objectives.”
Krieger pointed out similar problems in the civilian world. Even the very effective Forum for Hostages and Missing Families, which has been running since October 7 to represent hostage families, is staffed by volunteers who, although highly motivated, are not as effective as trained professionals. Moreover, there is no uniformity in messaging, with each family expressing their message in a different way, and there is a big gap between the government and the Forum.
“Everybody is trying to change their stance (at the political level),” Krieger said, noting the complexities of negotiating the hostage situation while remaining strong. He acknowledged that the government is in a difficult position, needing to project strength, fight a war, bring hostages home, negotiate with terrorists and appease Americans, leading to the hostage issue being overlooked.
To achieve effective public diplomacy, a structured framework needs to be created, which is currently lacking. Conricus proposed several solutions to address this issue.
A well-funded and well-led national public relations agency: A specialized agency with clear guidelines and budget for communications focused on Israeli, Arab, and international audiences is needed. This agency should include a team of experts skilled in strategy, visual imagery, social media, fact-checking, and open source intelligence. Fact-checking and intelligence team: A specialized team should be established to rapidly verify information and counter misinformation spread by Hamas and other enemies. Currently, delays in responding to false narratives cause great PR damage. Improved visual capabilities: Israel needs a specialized unit to effectively collect and distribute visual content. The combat camera units of enemies such as Hamas and Hezbollah often outperform Israeli units in this regard.
Despite the current improvisational response, there are some success stories within the IDF spokesperson unit that could lead to the creation of a civilian unit. Conricus noted that the IDF prioritizes foreign media, ensuring that international media gets breaking news before local reporters. Additionally, military officials have responded appropriately to crisis communications. For example, during the World Central Kitchen (WCK) incident, which Conricus called “the mother of all crisis communications,” the IDF chief of staff issued a statement in English at 2 a.m., prioritizing foreign media. “This is exactly the media we need, and the international media needs to be on the front lines to preserve Israel’s legitimacy and fight our legitimate battles.”
Levy agreed with the need for a new organization, emphasizing the reliance on volunteers during the war. He stressed the need for trained spokespeople backed by a professional infrastructure. After leaving office, Levy, with the support of Diaspora Minister Amichai Chikli, started a popular podcast called “State of the Nation” to provide accurate information to influencers in the diaspora.
Krieger stressed the importance of building quality relationships with media representatives, rather than treating interactions purely transactional. “We need to build relationships with key journalists and others who need to tell our stories,” Krieger said, emphasizing the need to identify key media outlets and audiences and ensure journalists tell stories from an Israeli perspective.
No discussion of Israel’s public relations agenda is complete without considering the political dimension, and Kharkov, who moderated the webinar’s Q&A session, argued that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s political priorities and personality may be contributing to the lack of urgency in establishing a strong public diplomacy framework.
“Netanyahu left several positions vacant when he took office in 2022, including a coordinator for hostage negotiations. There is someone there now, but he didn’t have a consul general in New York. He didn’t think it was important to have that right away… and he never made these things a priority,” Kharkov said. Netanyahu’s historical distrust of the foreign ministry and his ability to communicate in English may have further complicated the situation.
Moreover, as Krieger pointed out, since October 7 we have had a situation where we have two foreign affairs ministers who are not native English speakers: “The foreign office is the face of the country and it should be there. … So if they can’t communicate at a high level in English, they should at least have staff who can.”
In addition to a lack of English language skills at the government level, there is also a lack of internal communication: In the same week that Levy was suspended and then fired as government spokesman, Netanyahu complained to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that “I can’t find anyone who can put two words together in English.” According to Elon, no one had informed Netanyahu of Levy’s suspension at this point, and he was likely not fully aware of the situation, even though Levy was working as spokesman in the prime minister’s office.
Conricus summed up the dilemma as a lack of political will, noting that Israeli public relations is not a national priority. “It needs to be a coordinated effort, with money, effort and people,” he said, suggesting that things may need to get worse before politicians realize the importance of effective public diplomacy.
“Unfortunately, national PR is not a national (political) priority. It is entertainment, a one-man show. In some cases, an unmanned show. It needs to be an organized entity with funds, effort and personnel… Pessimistically, the situation may not yet be bad enough for this to happen. We may need to experience a US arms embargo or US moves to end the war without defeating Hamas for politicians to realize that there is a direct link between the quality of PR and their ability to pursue strategic goals.”
All speakers highlighted key elements that highlight Israel’s public relations challenges and hint at effective solutions. Despite current public failures at the private level, effective public diplomacy is crucial to a nation’s strategic interests, especially for a country facing unique geopolitical challenges like Israel. Public diplomacy not only shapes international perceptions but also influences a country’s ability to operate on the global stage. For Israel, whose security and strategic decisions are subject to intense international scrutiny, having a strong public diplomacy framework is not a luxury but a necessity.
To achieve this, Israel needs to move from an ad-hoc, volunteer-driven approach to a more organized, professional system. This will involve not just responding to crises but proactively shaping the narrative and building relationships with international media. Doing so will enable Israel to better manage its international image, counter misinformation, and rally support for its policies and actions.
Israeli public diplomacy faces significant challenges, exacerbated by lack of preparation, inadequate infrastructure, and political inertia. Establishing a specialized institute dedicated to public diplomacy, improving fact-checking and visual capabilities, and nurturing quality relationships with media professionals are important steps to enhance Israel’s image and support its strategic objectives. Political dimensions, especially the priorities and perceptions of leadership, play a key role in these efforts. Effective public diplomacy is not just a tactical necessity, but a strategic driver essential to Israel’s long-term security and international relations.
